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Abstract
Technulogy spillovers from high productivity countries in the Nor[h allow low
productivity countries in the South to improve productivity in high-tech sectors at
relatively low cost. However, the South's share in world goods marke[s for high-tech
products is relatively low, which reduces the revenue base from which RBcD activities
have to be financed. Our simple Ricardian endogenous growth model shows how the
balance between toughness of competition in trade and the strength of North-South
spillovers determines whether productivity levels diverge, partially converge or fully
converge in the long run. Under divergence, relative wages in the South steadily fall




Productivity levels differ widely across countries. Developing countries, or, more
generally speaking, low productivity countries, lack the knowledge to produce goods
according ro the technology and quality that prevail in high productivity countries. Under
suitable conditions, developing countries may gradually close the knowledge gap by
assimilating the rich world's methods and standards. Firms in the relatively poor countries
(the South) learn from firms in the relatively rich countries (the North). Suitable
conditions refer to, among others, property rights, labour skills and macro-economic
stability as emphasized by Abramovitz (1989).
The empirical literature (e.g. Baumol and Wolff, 1988; Scete and Verspagen, 1993)
documents that low productivity countries may join the "club" of converging countries,
catching up to the high productivity levels of the leader country. However, other
countries are destined to join a club that steadily falls behind.
Catching-up is not a free lunch. Learning and the assimilation of techniques require
investment efforts, although lower ones than the development of entirely new techniques
at the technology frontier. A sufficient market share is needed to cover the cost of this
RXcD investment. This is why competition enters the story. High productivity firms in the
North have a large market share on world markets. This provides the revenue base for
RBcD activities, which improve their competitiveness by shifting the technology frontier.
Southern firtns, in contrast, face a low market share for their products which either have
lower quality or are expensive relative to the competing products of the Notth. If
competition is tough, Southern firms have not sufficient revenues to finance the RBrD
activities that could close the technology gap. In that case, there is divergence rather than
convergence in productivity levels, despite the presence of international knowledge
spillovers.
When low productivity countcies catch up (or fall behind), large shifts in the
international division of labour and the economic struciure within rich countries may
occur. This is sometimes feared in rich countries. Developing countries have low wages
which may threaten employment in high wages countries. However, wage differentials
reflect productivity differentials and catching-up induces a relative wage increase in the
South. Unless specific circumstances prevail, international competition and trade is
beneficial to all trading partners. Another issue, not the focus of this paper, is that there
may be unfavourable distribu[ional effects, immiserizing the unskilled workers in the
North as discussed in Bhagwati (1994). Furthermore, there may be problems on the
sectoral level in the North in case of convergence, because firms in the high-[ech sector
are confronted with a fall in market share. Domestic markets have to be flexible enough
to faciliate adjustment.
We analyse [he dynamics of convergence and its consequences for domestic economic
structure in the context of a simple two-sector two-country endogenous growth modeL To2
delineate our model it is instructive to compare it with the hysteresis model by Grossman
and Helpman (]991, Ch. 8). In the latter model, RB~D feeds upon public knowledge.
These spillover effec[s may be national in scope, which implies that the country with the
highest public knowledge in RBcD in the initial situa[ion specializes partially in the
generation of technological know-how. In our model there are no spillovers of this kind.
Each firm builds upon its own experience and all knowledge is [acit or firm-specific.
Therefore no country specializes in knowledge production. However, [here is a spillover
effect from the developed to the developing economy, which may lead to catching-up. In
the terminology of Grossman and Helpman this may be seen as a global spillover effect,
but in contrast with their analysis of global effects ours is one-sided and self-destructive.
It ceases to be effective once catching-up is comple[ed. The idea that the accumulation of
knuwledge is primarily an in-house activity of firms is supported by casual evidence (e.g.
Pavitt, 1984; Dosi, 1988). If this is taken for granted the analysis can be enriched by
asswning that ín addition tu the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge tirms can Iearn
from each other as we have shown elsewhere in the context of a fully symmetrie model
without one-sided catching-up possibilities (Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1994). For
the present purpose there seems no need to complicate the anatysis by introducing
technological spillovers across firms in the same country.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced and the
possibilities for the international division of labour are presented. Temporary equilibrium
solutions for different specializiation regimes are presented in Section 3 along with an
analysis of their comparative statics. Dynamic issues come to the foreground in Section 4.
It is shown under which condi[ions countries convergence or diverge. Starting from an
initial situation with a relatively low productivity level in the high-tech sector of the
developing economy, equilibrium trajectories for relative wages and relative productivity
levels are derived analytically. The issue of strategic behaviour is touched upon and
illustrated by means of a numerical example. The paper concludes with an evaluation of
the rcwlts in Scctiun 5.
2. A slightly asymmetric two-sector two-country model
There are two countries, which have the potentiality to produce traditional goods (y) or
high-tech goods of specification i (x„ with i- L...n; the number of products n is
constant). Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over both categories and spend a
fraction 1-a of their income on traditional goods. There is only one factor of production,
labour. Productivity in the traditional sector is constant and is set at unity for convenien-
ce. In contrast, labour productivity in producing high-tech goods (denoted by h) can be
increascd by spending on RBcD. Expenditure on RBrD is an investmen[, which could be
modellcd in a world of perfect foresight by standard optimization techniques. Here we3
take a short-cut by assuming that there is a fixed ratio between labuur allocated to
production and to RBcD in each high-tech sector. Although this approach may seem rigid,
it may be more realistic in a world of uncertainty and unpredictabilíty. Preferences for
high-tech goods are of the Dixit-Stiglitz type. Accordingly, each good i has its own niche
and monopolistic compe[ition between firms within and across national borders leaves
each producer with a monopoly profit to cover RBcD expenses and other fixed costs.
Countries are symmetric' apar[ from two exceptions. First, the developing economy
(or the South, labeled country 2) has a substantial lower labour productivity in the high-
tet:h sector compared with the developed economy (or the North, country 1). This type of
backwardness is simply inherited from the past. Second, conditions have changed in a
favourable way and country 2 is able to assimilate knowledge from the richer economy.
This catch-up process by the developing economy is the only spillover effect in the
model. Apart from this, each firm in the high-tech sector learns from its own past
experience in performing RBrD activities. Knowledge in each firm is completely tacit and
therefore not public except for the one-sided spillover from the rich to the poor. Because
all firms build upon accumulated knowledge, the model generates (endogenous) growth. It
may converge to a steady state eventually, as catching-up is self-defeating and comes to a
stop once both countries have the same productivity in producing high-tech goods. In a
steady state growth pattern the traditional sector benefits from the dynamism in the high-
tech sector by improving its terms of trade.
Production of traditional commodities follows from:
L (2.1)
Y - ~
whcre L,, denotes the amount of labour allocated to the traditional sector. Time subscripts
are umitted where this dcks not lead to confusion. If the eyuations tbr both countries are
similar we presem only une equation. Under [he assumption of perfect competition, the
price of these goods equals labour cost:
R - w, (2.2)
where w denutes the wage rate.
There are n firms in the high-tech sector of each country producing 2n varieties
altugether. Denoting labour productivity in this sector by h and labour employed in
production by L„ we may write output x (measured in quality units) of variety i as:
x, - h, Lr, (2.3)
' Hence we assume the labour force, numbrr uf rirms and fixed cost to be eyual in both countries (L'-L~, n~-n1,
andf-~). In the appendia, we sulve the model fix asymmetry in these variables.4
RáD-activity in each sub-sector r is related to the amount of labour allocated in producti-
on. Denoting labour employed in the RBcD department by L„ we have
L.~ - R L~, (2.4)
RlkD generates an increase in labour productivity, depending on the amount of labour L,
and the level of knowledge firms have acquired in the past (h). The developing economy
(country 2) may catch-up by learning from the experience in the developed econonry
(country 1). This spillover depends positively on the gap between the firms' productivity




h~ - ~"l:~L; ~ ~~ ~ ,.
where a dot over a variable indicates the time derivative. The parameter cx measures the
strenght of the spillover effect. It captures the institutional factors that determine the
capacity to exploit knowledge spillovers.
As observed above, consumers spend a fraction 1-a of their income on tradi[ional
goods and a fraction a on high-tech goods. Equilibrium in the markets for traditional
goods requires that the amount spent in the world economy on these goods must be equal
to the value of traditional goods produced in the world as a whole. A similar relation
holds tbr high-tech goods the value spent must equal the value of production. Assuming
symmctry with respect to the varieties of the high-tech sector in each country separately,
we may write:
1 -~J 1''Pv ' Y-P~ (2.6)
o n'.r'p' } n-xzpZ
where p denotes the price of high-tech goods. Preferences are uniform across countries.
Preferences over varieties are given by a CES function with an elasticity of substitution
equal to e 1 1. As a result, demand for any variety of country 1 relative to demand for
any variety of country 2 depends on the relative price of these varieties according to the
formula:
xl p' X2 - fPZl
(2.7)
Each firm faces a demand curve for its product with an own price elasticity equal to e.
We assume that n is sufficientiy large so that profit-maximizing firms compete




Labour market equilibrium implies that exogenous labour supply L equals labour
demand. To complete the picture, it is assumed that firms in [he high-tech sector incur
fixed labour cost (~ of a traditional type. Equilibrium in the labour market then requires:
[,~ t n(L~ .L, f~ - L
(2.9)
Equations (2.])-(2.4) and (2.6)-(2.9) determine temporary equilibrium by solving for
the variables- y. L~, x, L,. L„ plw, prlw, and p~lp', given labour productivity h which is
predctermined hy RBcD activities in the past. Equation (2.5) then provides the dynamic
part of the model, by determining how productivity evolves over time.
Since the product varieties produced in the high-tech sector in different countries are
imperfect substitutes, consumers demand all varieties that originate from both countries,
even if unc country supplies varieties at a lower price. In contrast, traditional gooás are
perfect substitutes. Hence, only if the production cost for traditional goods is equal across
countries, both countries will produce these goods. Otherwise, total production of
traditional goods is located in the country with lowest price. As a result, two regimes are
possible, characterized formally by:
y`?0 and y'70 iff py' - p,~, i,jE {1,2}, i~j (Equal wage regime)
(2.10)
y' - L,.' - 0 iffp,' ~ pY, i,jE{1,2}, i~j (Specialization regime)
In the next section we start with a static or temporary equilibrium solution for given
ht and h-' in case both countries are producing the traditional good. The solution with one
country specializing in the production of traditional goods will be discussed subsequently.
3. Temporary equilibrium solutions and comparative statics
3.1. Equal wage regime
If traditional goods are produced in both regions, we have pY~ - prz - pY. As appears
from eyuation (2.2), this implies equality of wages w' - wZ. Taking account of wage
equalization, substitution of equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), and (2.8) into (2.6) results after
some manipulation in:
' Note that therc is one set uf eyuatiuns for each country, which results in 16 eyuations, solving the variablcs
mentioneJ (nr each country. In fact unly IS variables neeJ to be solveJ, since p'~p~ applies to both countries. IndeeJ,
by Walras~ law, unc cyuation is rcJunJanl.6
~~~ ~ Lr~ ~ ~ ~ o~~~ ~~1 ~n~L~ ~ ~~~
(3.l)
Adding the labour market equilibrium relations (2.9) for both countries and substituting
(2.4), gives the aggregate resource constraint:
~LY f Lyl - 2(L-nf) -(1 t~3)n~Li f L~, (3.2)
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) determine worldwide allocation of labour over both sectors,
characterized by [L,.'fL,~[ and [L~'fL~2]. To find how the labour allocation of each
country separately is related to worldwide allocation, we substi[ute (2.3) and (2.8) into
(2.7), taking into account wage equalization, and rewrite the result in the following ways:
~L~ t L~~ - ~d~-~ f~~ L~ (3.3)
~L~ t L~~ - ~d r,--u ,l~L~ (3.4)
where d-hZlh' denotes the productivity ratio in the high-tech sector.
Figure I characterizes this short-run equilibrium. The first quadrant depicts (3.1) and
(3.2). The point of intersection S determines worldwide allocatiun of labour. The fourth
yuadrant depicts (3.3) and (3.4) to determine L~' and L.~2 respectively. Finally, the third
quadrant shows the (uniform) ]abour market constraint (2.9) to detetmine L~.' and LYZ.
FiQUre 1
Country 2(the South) has low productivity (dG 1). This implies that (3.3) lies below
(3.4) so that L,' ~ L,1 and Ly' G Lyz. The higher productivity allows country 1 to
produce high-tech goods at lower cost. It has a comparative advantage in high-[ech goods
and specializes relatively in these goods.
A shift in prcferences [uwards high-tech goods, i.e. a rise in o, rotates the curve for
eyuation (3.1) to the right. Worldwide production shifts away from tradi[ional goods
towards high-tech goods. Both countries expand national production in this sector and
withdraw labour from traditional production. If the preference shift is so large that (3.1)
rotates to point Q, country 1 locates its total labour force L in the high-tech sector. At
this point there is a regime switch in the specialization pattern.
A similar result may be obtained in case the relative productivity level in the high-
tech sector changes in favour of country 1(i.e. d declines). This change makes the line
corresponding to (3.3) steeper and that to (3.4) Flatter so tha[ both lines diverge more.
The productivity change increases the comparative advantage of country 1 and increases
its degree of specialization in high-tech goods.7
3.2 The partial specialization regime
The regime of partial specialization applies when tradi[ional goods are produced in
country 2(the South) exclusively and country 1(the North) produces high-tech goods
only.' The relative price of goods is then determined by supply and demand. Substituting
of eys. (2.l) -(2.3), and (2.8) in (2.6), taking account of y' - Ly' - 0, and eliminating
L., using (2.3), (2.4), (2.7), and (2.9) for country 1, we tind the semi-reduced demand
eyuation:
Lz - 1-a e L-n! ~w , fw-~d~-i~. (3.5)
a ~ -I 1 fi3
where w - tiv'~w' deno[es relative wages. Substitution of eqs. (2.3), (2.4), and (2.7) in the
labour market eyuilibrium relation for country 2, eq. (2.9), results in the semi-reduced
supply eyuation:
- (L -n~~l -w ,:d, c~.
The eyuilibrium solution for relative wages and traditional sector employment is at the
intersection of both curves as illustrated in Figure 2.
Fieure 2
With the employment in the traditional goods sector determined, it is straightforward to
find the amount of lahour allocated in the high-tech sector L~2 as shown in the lower panel
of Figure 2. The regime of partial specialization requires w-tvz~w' G 1. A shift in
preferences towards the traditional good, i.e. a fall in a, shifts the demand curve (3.5) in
an upward direction. The relative price of traditional goods rises and these goods need to
be produced in both economies if the preference shift is large. Such a regime switch
obtaines when supply and demand intersect at point S' in Figure 2. A similar result holds
in case of catching-up. In particular, a rise in d shift both curves upward and the relative
wage rises. Intuitively, country 1 looses some of its comparative advantage in high-tech
goods so that its share in world-wide production of these goods falls. Worldwide,
consumers devote a larger fraction of their high-tech expenditures on high-tech goods
originating from country 2 so that relative (wage) income in this country rises.
'"rh~~ staric eyuilihrium in case traJitional guocls are proJuced in country I exclusivety (L,1-0) is symrnetric to the
case JiscusseJ. Nute from figure I(and our discussion of a change in J) that the former case arises only if' J~l.
Ilnnce, this case is not of interest, since we focus un the situatiun in which country 2 has lower productivi[y so that it
fa~e, ear~n-~p ~,pp~~nt,niue.. i.C. du.8
3.3 Linking the two regimes
The productivity gap d determines which regime applies. If productivity levels differ
substantially (i.e. d sufficiently small, say dGd~`G I) country I specializes in high-tech
goods. If productivity differences narcow through a process of catching up (i.e. d rises so
that d~`GdG 1), the equal wage regime becomes relevant. If the catch-up process is
completed (i.e. d-1), productivity differences are removed completely, and the structure
of both economies is uniform. The positive relation between the catch-up variable d and
the wage ratio w in case of specialization can be found by equating eqs. (3.5) and (3.6).
Within the eyual wagc regintc, w-1 irrespectivc of the value of d. }íence, over the entire
range 0 c dc 1 where catch-up for the South is relevant, w and d are related in general
eyuilibrium accurding to:




1 } llaal I~E~J lltaJ (GE) (3.7)
w - 1 for d~`Gd51
where d~` is the switching point between the two regimes. We can express d~` in terms uf
the parameters e, a, and (i, by substituting w- 1 in the first equation in (3.7).
Figure 3a presents (3.7) as the general equilibrium (GE) locus. The allocation of labour
in both countries is presented for d 5 1 in Figure 3b with respect to the high-tech sector
(L,) and in Figure 3c with respect to the traditional sector (L~)".
Fieure 3
As lung as the developed country produces high-tech goods only (i.e. when the
specialization regime applies, dGd~`), there is no intersectoral reallocation in the
developed economy, but labour moves away from the y-sector towards the x-sector in the
developing country when that country catches up. The low productivity country improves
its position un the world market for high-tech goods. At the same time, the position of the
high productivity country on this market declines relatively. It can only maintain its high-
tech production levels and employment by accepting a decline in wages relative to the low
productivity country (w-w2~w' rises) so [hat wage cost decline.s
' The analytical expressionn tbr labour allocation in the equal wage regime follnw in a straighttbrward way from
(3.1)-(3.4). Equations (3,4), (3.5), (2.9) anJ the condition L,'-0 yield labour allocation in the specialization regime.
` Due tu this change in rela[ive wages, the world price index for high-tech goods declines relative to the price for
[raditiunal goods (which eyuals [~), which explains the fall in world consumption and production of traditional goods
(L,' (alls and L,'-0).9
[n the equal wage regime (where d7d~`), labour moves out of the high-tech sector
into the traditional sector in the developed economy when this country looses comparative
advantage in high-tech goods production. The reason is that it cannot any longer reduce
wages relative to the low productivity coun[ry to maintain high-tech employment, since its
wages are already as low as in the low productivity country. Lower wages would result in
a reversal of the specialization pattern with the high productivity country producing for
total world traditional goods demand. In the catching-up country, intersectoral labour
reallocation away from the traditional sector occurs at a faster rate than in the
specialization regime. This is pussible because the developed country takes over a larger
and larger part of world production of traditional goods.
"I'he main question is of course whether there will be catching-up starting from an
initial position with d c 1. "Co answer this yuestion we now turn to the dynamics of the
tnudel .
4. To be or not to be: convergence or divergence
Firms in the high-tech sector apply resources to produce new technologies for the
production of differentiated goods. The amount of labour in RBcD is related to direct
productive labour according tn (2.4). Substituting this equation in (2.5), we can write the
growth rate of labour productivity in the high-tech sector of country 1 as:
ir'Ih' - ~(3L; - (4.1)
The developing country can attain a higher rate of growth per unit of labour employed in




The relative change in the catch-up factor d can be written as dld - hz~h2 - h`~h`.
Subtracting equation (4.1) from equation (4.2), and taking account of equations (2.3),
(2.7) and (2.8), we arrive aC
d~d - ~RL~
~~-~d~-~ „ -1~.
The associated ct-0 locus is given by:
d - ~t~r~-,-,.i, (d-~)
(4.3)
(4.4)10
For c~1e-1, the differential equation (4.3) is stable and the d-0 locus (4.4) is
downward sloping. This is illustrated in Figure 4a where the general equilibrium (GE)
curve (3.7) is confronted to the d-0 locus (4.4). The small arrows indicate the qualitative
law of motion for the prvductivity gap variable d. S[arting from an initial position d„ and
w„ the system moves along the general equilibrium locus towards the steady state where
the GI; Icxus and the d-0 locus intersect, i.e. the point d- 1, w- l.
Fieure 4a Fieure 4b
The country with lower productivity (the South) employes a smaller amount of labour in
high-tech goods and performs less RBcD ac[ivities than [he high productivity country.
However, it benefits from a higher productivity of RBcD activities because of the
technology spillover associated with the productivity gap. Under the condition e-1Ga, the
latter effect of lagging behind in productivity outweighs the former effect so that
productivity growth in the low productivity country is higher than in the high productivity
country. Consequently, productivity and wage levels converge over time. In particular,
the developing econvmy can assimilate easily advanced techniques from the developed
country as indicated by a relative high value for a. Moreover, the prvduct varieties
supplied by the developing country differ substantially from that from the developed
country, as indicated by a relatively low value for the substitution elasticity e. Hence,
despite the lower productivity and higher prices compared to the developed country, the
developing country can compete relatively easily on the world market for high-tech
goods. Products from the Svuth have their own niche providing sufficient revenues to
catch up. Productivity growth in the developed country (the North) is constant until the
pvint d- d' is attained~. Thereafter, growth in the North declines as an increasing
amount of labour has to be used in the traditional sector.
The situation differs dramatically if e-11 a. Under this condition the differential
equation (4.3) is unstable and the economies may diverge completely as shown in Figure
Sa. The d-0 curve slopes positively and intersects the general equilibrium locus again at
the points w- 1, d- 1. The small arrows indicate the law of motion for d. Starting
from an initial position d- do the developing economy falls steadily behind the
developed economy. There is divergence all the way to the bottom as d approaches zero.
However with both curves sloping upward there is the possibility of multiple intersections
as shown in Figure Sb. At point S there is a stable equilibrium. An initial si[uation in the
region d c d„ c 1 leads to a long-run solution at point S in Figure Sb. For values of the
catch-up variable which are not too low, partial convergence to the level d-d is possible.
Which situation vbtains depends upon the relative values of the elasticity of substitution e
`' Growth in country I is a constant (QQ) times L,', see (4.1). Hence, the relation between L,~ and d presented in
Pigure 3b also indicares how h'Ih' changes during Ihe catch-up process.11
and the catching-up elasticity a. Divergence (as illustrated in Figure Sa) is inevitable for
(e - i) 1~ a, but partial convergence (as in Figure Sb) may be the outcome for (e - 1)
~ cx .
Fieure Sa Fieure Sb
Under the condition e-1 ~c~, competition on the world market for high-tech goods is
relatively tough (i.e. e large). As a consequence, a small productivity gap implies a large
difference in market shares. The low productivity country has a relatively small fraction
of its labour force employed in high-tech production and RBcD. If the differenees in RBeD
intensity are not offset by large differences in RBtD productivity across countries due to
low technology spillovers (i.e. a small), productivity growth in the North is higher than
in the South, and world-wide productivity levels diverge.
However, Figure Sb shows that divergence may not be necessary if the ini[ial
pruductivity gap is not too large (i.e. if d„~d) and it e-1 exceeds a not too much. In that
case, there is partial convergence towards [he stable equilibrium S. In this long-run
eyuilibrium, Southern firms allocate less labour in the RBcD department than Northern
firms, but the difference is exactly matched by the knowledge spill-over so that
productivity growth in both regios is equal. In moving from do to d in figure Sb, the rise
in relative wages (w) is moderate so that Sou[hern firms can compete succesfully with
Northern firms. Beyond d relative wages are high and Southern fitms loose too much
ground to maintain sufficiently large expenditures on RáD.
Profits and strategic considerations
It tihould be noted that profitability in the high-tech sector in the North may be relatively
high initially. Production cost are lower than in the high-tech sector of the South and the
number of firms (and traditional fixed costs) are assumed to be equaL This may give rise
to some fonn of stratcgic behaviour on the part ot' Northern firms in case of convergence.
Firms in the North could increase their RBcD efforts relative to firms in the South to
block full convergence. With (3` ~(3Z the d-0 curve and the GE locus for the
specialization regime read respectively (see appendix):
d -
p~ i~i~-i-,.~
~ N ~ w ~I(r.-I -v~
Q~
i ( l
( ~}~i 1 w - I i Qa I ~ E E i J I 1 t(jz
1-7
i } liaal
1e111E1~ ~iIRZ~ d - w
(d-0) (4.5)
(GE for wG 1) (4.6)12
Assutning a'~RZ and e-1 Ga leads to a downward shift of the d-0 curve and GE
locus compared with the situation presented in Figure 4a. For a sufficient high relative
value of R' convergence may be attained in the specialization regime as shown in Figure
4b. Convergence comes to a halt before the developed economy is forced into the
production of tradi[ional goods. In the steady state equilibrium (point S in Figure 4b) the
rate uf pruductivity growth will be higher in both countries. More labour is allocated to
RBcD in the developed ecunomy, whereas [he developing eeonomy keeps catehing-up at a
constant rate in the long-run equilibrium to compensate for a lower RBcD effort.
It rcmains to he seen whether this strategy is profitable from the vantage point of
Northern firms. Iligher RXcll efforts mean higher cost which have tu be recouped by
increased sales some time in the future. Whether this is possible depends on the
paramerers of the model. ~Che numerical exercise' presented in Figure 6 sheds some light
on this issue.
Fieure tí
In figure 6 we show the time paths of real profits of high-tech firms in the developed
economy for a situation with equal research cffor[s (R' - I32), corresponding to the path
of convergence in Figure 4a, and a situation with (3'~aZ, corresponding to the path of
convergence in Figure 4b." In both cases protïts rise over time due to the productivity
growth. In case of equal research efforts (R' -Q`), the growth rate of real profits in the
North slows down when a regime switch occurs at t- t, and the country starts
production of traditional goods. For t 1 t„ labour is gradually pulled out of the
pruduction of high-tech goods. The volume of production of x-goods declines and growth
in real profits falls. In contrast, there is no regime switch in case R' ~ (32. Therefore the
high growth rate of profits can be maintained all the way in the latter case. However,
profits start at a lower level since RBr.D expenditures are higher and it takes some time to
overtake the other path. At the point t- t~ profíts on both paths are equal. Thereafter
profits on the high RBcD path exceed those on the equal RBcD effort trajectory. The
decision to raise RBcD depends of course on the discount rate which is not specified in the
model. For sufficient low values of the interest rate it may be worthwhile for high-tech
firms in the developed economy to embark on an agressive RBr.D strategy.
' The exercise is based on the Iiilluwing values: L'-L'-5000, f-~-20, n'-rt'-40, ~'-Q'-0.0025, a-0.9, e-3,
n-3, d(0)-0.8. In case o(eyual research efforts (3'-R'-0.05, in the asymtnetric ease, p'-0.06 and Q~-0.05.
" Protíts rre Jetlated by the cunsumers price index.13
5. Evaluation
As Romer (1993) argues, it can be sta[ed that developing economies are poor because
they suffer from an idea gap. Producers in these countries do not have access to the ideas
that are applied in developed economies. Bridging the gap may be a matter of organizing
the economy in a way that facilitates learning. Investment in physical infrastructure and
education along with the maintaining of property rights may set the stage for ca[ching-up.
Foreign direct investment with important spillover effects on the domestic economy may
accelerate the process. The factors are condensed in the catch-up parameter a.
However, as our analysis shows, toughness of competition is another important aspect
of the convergence issue. If competition is mild, developing nations may easily find a
niche for their products even if the quality leaves something to be desired. In a world
with tough competition the engine of learning may be too weak to compensate for the lead
in RBcD performance in the indus[rialized world. Competition in our model is related to
the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products E. In reality there are other
factors of importance like for instance entry or exit of firms and strategic behaviour of
entrepreneurs. Tht: latter issue was touched upon in considering the consequences of a
higher Ró~D effort in developed countries to block a complete catching-up by developing
nations.
The economic consequences of catching-up for the developed eountries differ
according to the specialization regime. As long as developing nations are partially
specialized in the production of traditional goods, wages in the rich countries decline
relative to wages in the poor countries. In the equal wage regime, labour has to be
relocated in the developed economies from the high-tech sector towards the traditional
scctor. [f labour markets are rigid, such structural changes may cause adjustment
problems and unemployment.
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Appendix
This appendix solves the model allowing for differences in Q, n, L, and f across
countries.
Substitution of (2.3) and (2.8) into (2.7) yields:
L~ - L,~w
,~~:.,~ (A.1)
Adding the labour market constraints (2.9) for both countries and substituting (2.4) we
find the world labour market constraint [the counterpart of equation (3.2)]:
[L; . L~] - ~L'.LZ .n'j2-nz.Í2~ -
(1.~3')n'L~ - (1'Qz)n~Lz (A.2)
[n the equal wage regime, w'-w2 and LY'z0, LyZ)0. Substitution of (2.1), (2.2), (2.3)
and (2.8) into (2.6) yields the counterpart of (3.1):
v r ' `1
`LI } LZ~ - l]-a~ f E , Ln~L~
t nzLzl (A.3)
a e -1
Equations (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (2.9), and the condition w-wz~w'-1 solve the allocation
of labour (variables Ly', Ls', LY2, Lsz) in the equal wage regime. Note that under
asymmetry the worldwide intersectoral allocation of labour cannot be separated from the
country-specific sectoral allocation as we did in Figure 1.
In the specialization regime, Ly -0 and w-x~~w'C1. Substitution of (2.1), (2.2), (2.3)
and (2.8) into (2.6) yields: .15
Ly -
High-tech employment in country 1 follows from (2.4) and (2.9) with Ly'-0:
L; - L~ -n~fl
n' (1 t(3')
Substitution of (A.1) and (A.S) into (A.4) yields the counterpart of (3.S):
1-a e L' -n'f` rw -, ( n;1 w,:~,: -~l
a e -1 1 .(i n L,' -- L Il ll J
Substitution of (A.l), (A.S) and (2.4) into (2.9) yiclds the counterpart of (3.6):





L- - (L~ -n~.i~) - (L~ -n'f~) ~ ~R` n w-~d~-~
l 1 }Rr n!
Equating (A.ój and (A. i), we find the GE locus for ttic specia[ization regime:
CI -- W IL1-nf1f ItQ2l
w- ~1Qa1
IEE~J 11
Qzl f ni l
1 t 1-a e 1 I n2 I
l a J le-1, ~lfR2,
l 1
(A.7)
for w G 1
We arrive at (4.G) by setting n'-nZ, f-f, and L'-L2.ib
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Figure 5: tough competition
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Figure 6: blocking convergence
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